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1
Body Doubles, Babel’s Voices:
Katie Mitchell’s Iphigenia at Aulis and the Theatre of Sacrifice
[T]he symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing.1

1. Body doubles
16 July 2004: I’m a sweaty bundle of jitters in the back of the National Theatre’s
Lyttleton auditorium, shifting from side to side in my seat. On stage, Hattie Morahan and
Kate Duchêne, playing Iphigenia and Clytemnestra in Katie Mitchell’s production of
Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis, collapse into one another, a messy tangle of clutching
limbs. Iphigenia has just pleaded with her father Agamemnon (Ben Daniels) for her life,
but to no avail. She knows now that she must be murdered so that his fleet may make fast
for Troy, setting in motion a chain of events that will lead to the staging of one of ancient
Greece’s foundation myths of democratic civilization. And yet for Mitchell this is not a
moment of grandiose gesture or carefully coded sorrow: Morahan and Duchêne are
overwhelmed by their emotions in a manner that is rarely seen in British (or North
American) stage realism. They seem unable to get up; the women who form the chorus
help them struggle into chairs. Morahan says that they must sing ‘a last song, we must
sing it together’:2 they duly force a cheerful, journeying tune, through convulsive tears
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Jacques Lacan, ‘The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis’ (1956), in Anthony

Wilden (trans.), The Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 1-87 (p. 84).
2

I saw Iphigenia at Aulis twice: once live, at the Lyttleton Theatre, in mid-July 2004, and

again on archive video at the Royal National Theatre archives in London on 18 July
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and loud gasps that punctuate the song, awkwardly, with upset that seems somehow too
real, too much, for a play. They grab at each other’s faces, desperate for last touches of
comfort. Then, lights down: Achilles (Justin Salinger) enters, tells the assembled group
that Odysseus has decreed Iphigenia must die. The only low, low light on stage filters
through the huge windows that mark the upper edges of the Lyttleton proscenium,
radically foreshortened for this production. Iphigenia’s body, clad in her white wedding
dress, stands out starkly, remarkably bright against the moment’s gloom. The only other
object that catches my eye is the mannequin at centre stage who wears Iphigenia’s white
veil, the other portion of her dress’s couture; together, girl and mannequin provoke a
double-take, sear onto the darkened stage the uncanny image of a future lost in the ruse
that has brought Iphigenia to Aulis not for marriage, but for murder. For a tense moment,
we see Iphigenia, literally, as two bodies: the ethereal, other-worldly, virgin-white
mannequin body dressed for giddy anticipation, and the all-too-worldly body, in its
2006. The video I watched was recorded on 1 July 2004. Mitchell used Don Taylor’s
1990 translation of the play (reprinted by Methuen in 2004 as the production text), but
her cast also made a number of additions and improvisations in performance (see Maria
Shevtsova’s interview with Katie Mitchell, New Theatre Quarterly, 22:1 [2006], 3-18 [p.
14]). While I do not want to diminish the value of Taylor’s excellent translation or its
obvious importance to this production’s overall effects, because Mitchell and her actors
work with text in an interrogatory way (see my arguments below), frequently toying with
or even discarding the language of the play as written, I have chosen to take all
quotations from the performance I watched on archive video, cross-referenced with the
2004 Methuen text only when the audio was unclear.
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shadow, of a young girl viscerally and psychically overwhelmed by panic, grief, the
terror of what is to come. Iphigenia becomes a snapshot negative: her pain and fear are
tangibly, forcefully unmarked3 against the white of her duty to father and country. For
that tense moment we see her two bodies collide, feel them chafe hard against one
another.
The moment that follows brings thunderous change. The women barricade
themselves in the dilapidated building where they are lodged, their voices rising against
the vast din of the army’s machinery outside, in the wings. The lights come down, and
then, immediately, back up – cold, white, antiseptic, institutional. Iphigenia, shouting,
fighting with Clytemnestra, surprises everyone as she suddenly embraces her fate: ‘I must
die, and do it with dignity’. An old, 1940s-style standing microphone is brought on stage;
with it, she will now orchestrate a command performance of her own sacrifice, piped over
the P. A. system toward the crowd of citizens waiting just offstage. Those of us in the
Lyttleton house, however, form another kind of crowd, another kind of audience to
Iphigenia’s sacrificial staging: we may count ourselves privy to her backstage
preparations. We will not hear her perfect, unflinching self-abnegation, and we will not
see her miraculous transformation into a deer on the sacrificial altar – the transformation
that will supposedly confirm Iphigenia was correct to submit, was rewarded for the
willing gift of her body to slaughter, was not (in fact) slaughtered at all. Instead, we will
see the making of this ‘miracle’, the tricks of the theatre that allow a young girl’s violent
destruction to be passed off as a glorious gift to military adventure, made into myth as
3

See Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London and New York:

Routledge, 1993).

4
anything but murder. More than that: we will see the incredible, visceral struggle of the
body beneath the show and collide with the difficult question of how to encounter it, how
to move beyond our comfortable empathy to a more rigorous ethics of spectatorship.
What happens to a body when circumstance demands it enact its own forgetting?
How does it react, and what does it abreact? This is the story of the vulnerable, violated
female body forgotten, effaced, elided – by the machinations of performance. This is the
story of sacrifice’s careful staging – and of the sacrificial body’s unexpected,
performative return.
***
Perhaps I risk stating the obvious when I say that theatre is a remarkably
ambivalent medium. While many performance scholars (and I gladly include myself in
these ranks) cleave whole-heartedly to theatre’s power to represent injustice and provoke
social activism, students of Michel Foucault and after also know well performance’s
potential to act on behalf of state power, as national governments stage-manage the
appearance of their authority on a grand scale. From early English royal entry pageants to
the executionary theatres of the French Revolution; from Argentina during the Dirty War
to contemporary North Korea to George W. Bush proudly costumed as Commander-inChief on the deck of an air-craft carrier in the Persian Gulf, state performances routinely
mask the loss of human life with the pompous spectacle of national good, neatly effacing
massive suffering by eliding it with bodily sacrifice as a patriotic, even salvific practice.4
4

Diana Taylor has written extensively on the pageantry of Argentina’s Dirty War; see her

Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997); for a look into the state pageantry
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Theatre, in other words, embeds the malevolent power of what Diana Taylor calls the
‘disappearing act’: the power of performative erasure, through which personal trauma and
loss may be staged as public gain and violence as an act of grace, of national or cultural
salvation.5
In my work I am particularly interested in a specific facet of this power of
performative erasure, in which women who have been or are about to become the victims
of violence – even, and in fact especially, the most seemingly mundane, domestic acts of
violence – are enlisted to make their suffering disappear (or appear as other than
suffering), to enact its public cover-up. Their stagings reframe violence against women as
the reflection (rather than inversion) of a benevolent patriarchy, masking that violence’s
very source in the latter’s authority and thus protecting it from the threats misogynist
violence poses to its claims of good governance. These acts of erasure have a long and
difficult history: any heavily patriarchal culture relies for its perpetuation on the
containment and subordination of differently sexed and gendered bodies, and thus on the
performative and discursive elision of the routine violence of subordination that is the
crucial stuff of its power.6 But the disappearing acts that frame violence against women
of contemporary North Korea, see Suk-Young Kim, ‘Springtime for Kim Il-sung in
Pyongyang: City On Stage, City As Stage’, TDR, 51:2 (Summer 2007), 24-40.
5

‘[D]oesn’t theatre allow us to deny what we see with out own eyes?’ Taylor describes

this phenomenon as ‘percepticide’: the denial of what one sees that colludes with violent
power (Disappearing Acts, pp. 125, 123).
6

The perils of representing violence against women in public space have garnered a good

deal of recent feminist attention, especially in medieval and early modern studies. Much
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are not restricted to such cultures, nor are they restricted to a distant past: we see them
still in the increasingly egalitarian West, in contemporary rape trials where the burden of
work has been done on what Barbara Baines calls the “effacement” of rape in
Renaissance England, while scholars such as Frances Dolan, Emily Detmer, Margaret
Hunt and Laura Gowing have explored the representation of domestic violence against
women through the eighteenth century. See Baines, ‘Effacing Rape in Early Modern
Representation’, ELH, 65 (1998), 69-98; Dolan, ed., The Taming of the Shrew: Texts and
Contexts (Boston: Bedford, 1996), pp. 1-38; Detmer, ‘Civilizing Subordination:
Domestic Violence and The Taming of the Shrew’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 48:3 (1997),
273-94; Hunt, ‘Wife Beating, Domesticity and Women’s Independence in EighteenthCentury London’, Gender and History, 4:1 (1992), 10-33; and Gowing, Domestic
Dangers: Women, Words, and Sex in Early Modern London (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
Both Jody Enders and I have explored the specific tangle of rape’s effacement with acts
of performance; see Enders, ‘The Spectacle of the Scaffolding: Rape and the Violent
Foundations of Medieval Theatre Studies,’ Theatre Journal, 56 (2004), 163-181, and
Kim Solga, ‘Rape’s Metatheatrical Return: Rehearsing Sexual Violence Among the Early
Moderns’, Theatre Journal, 58 (2006), 53-72. For a trans-historical perspective on rape’s
evasive representations, see Lynn A. Higgins and Brenda R. Silver, eds, Rape and
Representation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Finally, Diana Taylor’s
work on the spectacles of elision during the Dirty War in Argentina represents a thorough
and non-Eurocentric read of the ways in which women’s bodies in violence have been
bound to the performance of South American machismo. See her Disappearing Acts, in
particularly ‘Caught in the Spectacle,’ pp. 1-27.
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proof of non-consent continues to be placed on victims, and in the countless women each
year who are abused at home and yet perform, on their public stages, the role of devoted,
loved, and protected wife. For me, two questions emerge from the long history of
performative disavowal that ghosts women’s bodies in violence. First, when women are
forced to enact the disappearance of their suffering, how do they accomplish it? And,
second: when they do, what remains behind, lurking just beyond the edges of the act?
How should we, as spectators but also as witnesses, respond both to that act and to its
after-image, the dark shadow of its remainder? Or, to put this conundrum in broader
terms: how may performance become the tool of violence’s reckoning – specifically, of
our reckoning with violence against women, and with the disappearing acts that
characterize its public history – rather than simply the tool of violence’s erasure?
Katie Mitchell’s Iphigenia at Aulis, staged at the Royal National Theatre in the
summer of 2004, offers me an ideal vehicle through which to explore these questions.
The play embeds a dramaturgical problem: despite Euripides’ trenchant critique of war
and the mundane barbarities that sustain it, at play’s end he asks that Iphigenia sacrifice
herself, gloriously and seemingly without prompting, to that very war. Audiences reared
on psychological realism are, not surprisingly, primed to ask why, to delve into
Iphigenia’s young mind looking for the clue to her about-face.7 Mitchell, however, is not
7

Several reviewers of Mitchell’s production took some pleasure in looking for this clue.

Aleks Sierz read in Morahan’s portrayal ‘the teenage passion of a Big Brother fan’
looking for martyrdom (Tribune, 25 June 2004); Patrick Marmion saw instead a ‘panting,
semi-sexual idealism’ in her embrace of sacrifice (Daily Mail, 25 June 2004). John Gross,
noting the scholarly controversy that has emerged over Iphigenia’s change of heart,
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at all interested in the promises of discovery made by standard-issue psychological
realism, and she is not interested in representing the ‘why’ of Iphigenia’s choice. Instead,
she offers her audiences the ‘how’, in excruciating detail: how Iphigenia enacts the
erasure of her impending violence, how the spectacle of sacrifice is built and on the burial
of what precarious, vulnerable bodies it relies. Following Stanislavsky but also departing
intentionally from the conventions of contemporary British and North American realist
acting, Mitchell employs a technique I, like Roberta Barker,8 characterize as a form of
‘radical’ naturalism, a science-based method of physical action that foregrounds the
visceral experience of affect rather than affect’s mimesis, both for actors and for
audiences.9 The result is the distressing, disquieting return of the body that rushes,
called Morahan’s performance ‘the embodiment of youth intoxicated by military
propaganda’ (Sunday Telegraph, 27 June 2004). In each case, reviewers characterize
Iphigenia’s choice as a childish one, something that allows them to lay blame for her
actions at the feet of the character’s youth without having to reckon with the larger
ethical problem Morahan’s performance makes manifest – that of violence’s imbrication
in the self-conscious theatricality of the moment.
8

See Roberta Barker’s discussion of Mitchell’s 1992 Royal Shakespeare Company

production of A Woman Killed With Kindness in her Early Modern Tragedy, Gender, and
Performance, 1984-2000: The Destined Livery (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan,
2007).
9

Mitchell has spoken at length in interviews about her working process, which she

characterizes as a Stanislavskian technique (Gabriella Giannachi and Mary Luckhurst,
eds., On Directing: Interviews with Directors [London: Faber, 1999], p. 97) telescoped
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retches, panics, feels too much, and makes us feel too much in the process – in other
words, the body banished by conventional acting technique, the body banished by
violence’s carefully-constructed performative cover-up. As Hattie Morahan forces
Iphigenia’s uncanny, suffering body up through the gap left by her not-quite-seamless
performance of sacrifice, the violence produced by theatricalizing that body’s denial – the
violence of the reality effect itself – becomes the subject of the last portion of Mitchell’s
production. Watching, listening, and – as I will argue – responding physically to
Iphigenia’s experience from backstage at the state’s power brokerage, we in the audience
are privy both to her act of erasure and to the distress of its production. We encounter at
every turn two bodies: the body sacrifice decrees, the body that gives itself up supposedly
willingly, but also the living, breathing, frightened, clutching, sweating, sobbing body
that sacrifice denies, must deny in order to stage-manage the image of patriarchal power
it is meant to manifest. As Iphigenia prepares to die, she infects the body of authoritarian

through her study and observation of directors such as Anatoly Vasilyev and Lev Dodin
in Russia, Poland, Lithuania and Georgia in1989. Her process involves lengthy, intensive
research and textual preparation (Shevtsova, interview with Mitchell, pp. 7-8; Helen
Manfull, In Other Words: Women Directors Speak [Lyme, NH: Smith and Kraus, 1997],
pp. 103-4), including research trips undertaken with her design team, as well as plenty of
work on text and intention with her actors in the rehearsal room. Actors work both
‘outside in and inside out’, weaving their emotions through specific, repeated physical
actions in a manner designed to produce particular emotional effects within the audience
(Shevtsova, interview with Mitchell, pp. 10-11).
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discourse, the body of performative convention, with the body it discards as both
meaningless and yet profoundly threatening.10
10

While my focus in this article is narrowed to Iphigenia at Aulis, I want to note that the

practices of Mitchell’s radical naturalism I explore below are in no way restricted to her
work on this production. They have become her directorial signature, and I see, in
particular, extraordinary parallels between their effects in Iphigenia and their effects in
Mitchell’s acclaimed 1992 staging of Thomas Heywood’s A Woman Killed With
Kindness at The Other Place, starring Michael Maloney and Saskia Reeves. (I saw
Mitchell’s A Woman Killed With Kindness on archive video at the Shakespeare Centre
Library in Stratford-upon-Avon on 11 July 2006.) In Heywood’s play, as in Euripides’,
the central dramatic conceit is the destruction of a young woman made to appear as
something entirely less malignant, something more akin to a gift from God or an act of
grace. Anne Frankford is banished by her husband for the crime of adultery, and yet his
promise to “kill” her “with kindness” resonates through the play as a covert act of torture
that refuses to reveal either its punitive roots or its vicious intent. Like Iphigenia, Anne
embraces her fate: she starves herself to death in penance. But, also like Iphigenia, the
cost of that embrace threatens both physically and psychically to overwhelm Anne.
Reeves’ performance, like Morahan’s twelve years later, staged both the body that
embraced and the body overwhelmed: barely able to speak her praise to her husband and
her Lord, Reeves’ voice during her climactic deathbed scene was audibly ravaged,
rasping, her frame barely able to heave itself up into a sitting position. Meanwhile, both
she and Maloney wept and keened loudly and sloppily in a manner that eerily anticipated
the later work of Morahan and Duchêne.
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2. Babel’s voices
To get to Iphigenia’s central moment – the moment of violence’s uncanny
transformation, of the title character’s desperate attempt to stage her own murder sous
rature – we first need to back up a bit. The centerpiece of Mitchell’s production is in fact
not Iphigenia at all, who plays a minimal role until her big scene late in the show, but
rather the chatty, sycophantic chorus of women from Chalcis, clad in black mid-century
Dior-style dresses, their handbags, compacts, and autograph books at the ready. As
numerous reviewers noted, these women were fidgety, twittering birds, ‘fussy, twitchy, a
constant neurotic fluster of grooming and lipstick’.11 They never stopped moving, rarely
stopped talking – and at several key moments they found themselves trapped in the bright
glare of lights beamed, surveillance-style, onto the stage from the auditorium space.
These lights always came up with an unholy, industrial clang that echoed through every
body in the theatre; pinned by their eye, the women amped up their already anxious,
manic energy. Splayed against the set’s back wall, stuttering their lines to the
audience/the lights, they fussed and dropped their handbags, attempted (inevitably failed)
escape into the wings, and broke into measured foxtrots at the sound of dance music
piped over the P.A. system. Reviewers’ assessments of the chorus women were decidedly
mixed. Approximately half found them to be an effective representation of the work’s
major themes, a strong reminder of how the mundane, in times of war, can become

11

Victoria Segal, Sunday Times (27 June 2004).

12
vicious, discombobulating, threatening.12 Others found that their excessive fidgeting and
garbled speech marred the performance, distracting audiences with moments of
misplaced comedy or farce.13
The chorus women’s mixed reviews are no surprise to me, for they perfectly
telescope the larger ethical questions I perceive at the heart of Mitchell’s work in this
production and elsewhere: What characterizes ‘good’ acting? How is it supposed to make
us, in the audience, feel? What extra-theatrical purposes does it serve? Does good acting
provoke a cathartic reaction? If so, who benefits? When is good acting benign, laudable,
and when is it potentially malignant, a risk to performers and spectators alike? Mitchell’s
women of Chalcis were, from the moment they entered near the top of the show, a clump
of awkward bodies press-ganged into an existing set of social and performative
conventions; the pressure to act properly bore down on them physically and psychically.
Under that pressure, they relentlessly messed up convention, making us painfully aware
12

See Benedict Nightingale, The Times (24 June 2004), Paul Taylor, The Independent (25

June 2004), Susannah Clapp, The Observer (27 June 2004), Victoria Segal, Sunday Times
(27 June 2004), Matt Wolf, International Herald Tribune (7 July 2004), and Rachel
Haliburton, The Spectator (10 July 2004). All London-based reviews of Mitchell’s
Iphigenia at Aulis are collected in London Theatre Record for 17-30 June 2004, pp. 82127. I have drawn all reviews I reference from this source.
13

See Patrick Marmion, The Daily Mail (25 June 2004), Nicholas de Jongh, The Evening

Standard (23 June 2004), Charles Spencer, The Daily Telegraph (24 June 2004), John
Gross, The Sunday Telegraph (27 June 2004), Michael Billington, The Guardian (23
June 2004), and John Thaxter, What’s On (30 June 2004).
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of the scripted lines within which they were unable to keep their bodies. Speaking to
Maria Shevtsova about the chorus, Mitchell characterized the women’s experience on
stage as a kind of endless, sinister audition, a decidedly theatrical process of psychic and
somatic control:
The performers were given very simple, concrete instructions to achieve the
effect. They were told that the lights suddenly went on and they saw hundreds of
men sitting in front of them, leaning back and smoking. The men said nothing,
they just looked at the women. It frightened the women, who finally came to the
conclusion that the men were expecting something of them. And, then, dance
music was suddenly pumped through the PA system in the room where the
women were and the women felt that they were being instructed to dance.
However, they had no partners and they were afraid, so they didn’t always dance
well.14
Accosted by an audience (one, rather ironically, that sounds remarkably like Brecht’s
idealized group of contemplative male smokers), the chorus women were constantly
made aware of the need to produce a particular look and feel, a specific set of reality
effects; they were constantly reminded that they were on a stage, and that their watchers
had certain expectations. The ethical circumstances that surrounded their being on that
stage, however – imminent war, a restless army, their ambivalent, uncertain responses to
Agamemnon’s cruel trick on his wife and daughter – prevented them from complying
altogether willingly with performance’s demands. Their conscious attempts to generate
the expected reality effect (the soothing appearance of the waving crowd; dancing for the
14

Shevtsova, interview with Mitchell, p. 13.

14
good of the war effort) were thwarted at every turn by gut reactions, by their bodies’
urges to flight, by the eruption of unconscious anxieties – low-level panic. What the
chorus women produced was not conventional ‘good’ acting at all, but the failure of that
convention in the face of the bodily and emotional needs it attempted to over-write.
Theirs was an urgent compulsion to conform, to ‘act natural’, coupled with a panicky
need to acknowledge what was being sidelined by the demand that provoked the
compulsion. Theirs was not proper naturalism, but naturalism performed under the fear of
– indeed, as a form of – physical and emotional violence.
One of the most controversial aspects of the chorus was its engagement with the
play’s text: Mitchell asked the chorus performers largely to disregard it. As she explains
in her interview with Shevtsova, she was less interested in the meaning of the chorus’
words than in the women’s actions and reactions to the time, place and circumstances in
which they found themselves: ‘I said: “You have just got to keep talking because there
are these men sitting there, looking at you, and, if you do not keep talking, they might do
something really ugly to you.” That, I think, is a hard acting task, particularly in British
theatre, because here the text is often seen as sacred and it is a risky business not to speak
it very clearly in a production’.15 Mitchell’s comments (inadvertently?) link the British
15

Ibid., p. 14. Mitchell’s fears were in part well founded; a number of reviewers

commented unfavourably on the actors’ ‘blurred voices’ (John Gross, Sunday Telegraph,
27 June 2004) or her broader liberties with the text (Gross; Carole Woddis, The Herald,
25 June 2004); Susannah Clapp, The Observer, 27 June 2004). But at least as many
reviewers understood Mitchell’s intentions and responded accordingly. In the
International Herald Tribune, Matt Wolf went so far as to invoke the expected
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theatre establishment’s anxiety over the centrality of the speech act in stage realism (‘the
text is often seen as sacred’; ‘You have just got to keep talking’) with the possibility of
real violence beneath the surface of that anxiety and its fraught expectations (‘if you do
not keep talking, they might do something really ugly to you’).16 Viewed through this
lens, the men staring down Mitchell’s chorus seem to be much more than just
representatives of a generic theatrical establishment: they channel the makers of early,
Ibsenite stage realism, naturalism at its inception, when the principal subject of the realist
stage was the woman with a past, and when any woman, should she fail to act her
feminine part properly, might become suspect and fall under difficult scrutiny.17
establishment reaction – ‘Aha! So Euripides wasn’t good enough for Katie Mitchell, you
are tempted to respond’ – only to challenge it with high praise in his review for The
International Herald Tribune (7 July 2004).
16

Earlier in her interview with Shevtsova, Mitchell makes a similar comment: ‘Much

mainstream theatre here is very preoccupied with words and hearing them spoken clearly.
There is less interest in representing human behaviour accurately […]. Expressions of
human behaviour in theatre tend to be either exaggerated or too discreet or made up of
self-conscious and artificial gestures and sounds. This type of theatre does not interest
me’ (pp. 8-9). It is, of course, these very ‘self-conscious and artificial gestures and
sounds’ that the chorus women attempt and fail to make before the glare of the lights.
17

My comments here and below build on Elin Diamond’s influential work on stage

realism, psychoanalysis and hysteria in her ‘Realism’s Hysteria: Disruption in the Theater
of Knowledge’ (in Unmaking Mimesis: Essays on Feminism and Theater [London and
New York: Routledge, 1997], pp. 3-39).
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Early realism understood the stage as a public venue for the talking cure emerging
from within psychoanalytic discourse at approximately the same time; its money shot was
the sick or hysterical woman’s all-important confession. For that woman, resolution on
this stage meant saying the right words, speaking the script on spec, while carefully
stage-managing her embodied reactions – it meant the all-important performance of her
body’s truth,18 a reality-effect designed to confirm her audience’s knowledge of and
power over her. In Studies in Hysteria, Freud shows his readers how completely the
talking cure relies on a rigidly conformist body aligned with the truth of the spoken word.
He knows when Elizabeth von R. has not told him the whole truth, because her body
rebels: her symptoms return.
As a rule the patient was free from pain when we started work. If, then, by a
question or by pressure upon her head I called up a memory, a sensation of pain
would make its first appearance, and this was usually so sharp that the patient
would give a start and put her hand to the painful spot. The pain that was thus
aroused would persist so long as she was under the influence of the memory; it
would reach its climax when she was in the act of telling me the essential and
decisive part of what she had to communicate, and with the last word of this it
would disappear. I came in time to use such pains as a compass to guide me; if
she stopped talking but admitted that she still had a pain, I knew that she had not
told me everything, and insisted on her continuing her story till the pain had been
talked away.19
18

Diamond, ‘Realism’s Hysteria’, p. 16.

19

Quoted in Diamond, ibid.
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The pain talked away: Freud’s method, however potentially curative, works to erase the
language, the evidence, of Elizabeth’s body. He reads that language, but only in order to
eradicate it; finally, her words will speak the truth he desires, making her body’s speech
redundant (and proving his speech all-powerful). How crucial, and yet finally how
forgettable, is Elizabeth’s body in Freud’s passage: her pain makes his analysis possible,
mimes his expectations – and then it simply goes ‘away’.
Or does it? Peggy Phelan offers a remarkable reading of the mis-placement of the
body in Studies in Hysteria,20 and reminds me that before there was a talking cure, there
was a physical cure, a clinical commitment to somatic experience within the
psychoanalytic apparatus that precedes Freud’s obsession with the curative potential of
the ‘right’ language. Rather than placing himself at a physical and emotional distance
from his patient, the analyst would strive to make an embodied connection with that
patient, to touch as well as read that patient’s pathology. For Phelan, the talking cure that
disavows its debt to and inescapable connection with the bodies of its subjects will find it
cannot compass the flesh it pretends to master with speech;21 her example is Josef
Breuer’s patient, Anna O. Once her treatment had ended, Anna apparently defied her
analyst by generating an hysterical pregnancy that implicated him, and specifically his
20

Peggy Phelan, Mourning Sex: Performing Public Memories (London and New York:

Routledge, 1997), pp. 44-72.
21

Like Phelan, Diamond theorizes a female body that may sign on stage ‘before’ the

referent, disrupting both naturalism’s and psychoanalysis’ claims to compass the
complexities of the female subject within their individual truth-telling (truth-making)
discourses. See ‘Realism’s Hysteria’.
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sexualized body, in their work together.22 Her body erupted, manic, from within the
comfortable frame of his analysis, leaving residual traces of his speech on, and in, her
flesh.
This is exactly the eruption, the defiance – of profane body into sacred text; of
acting body into watching body; of proper, contained speech by the complex psychosomatic experiences of brain and flesh – accomplished by Katie Mitchell’s radical
naturalism. Her performers disrupt the stage frame by producing not too little realism, but
much too much: not one seamless performance body, readable through the consistent arc
of its spoken and body languages, but the body psychological realism anticipates
alongside the bodily affects and experiences it suppresses, discards, deems
unassimilatable or mimetically unconvincing.23 This is not a Brechtian practice –
22

Phelan, Mourning Sex, pp. 64-7. Phelan notes that aspects of this story may be

apocryphal. Perhaps truth, perhaps fiction, its resistance to the analyst’s (or the scholar’s)
certitude only reinforces Phelan’s argument: the analysand’s body may not be so easily
autopsied by the analyst’s sure speech and exacting gaze.
23

I realize that my commentary here risks generalizing a generic ‘realism’ based on the
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Mitchell’s actors never step out of character; quite the contrary24 – although it holds the
same disruptive, de-realizing potential as Brecht’s best work does. Rather, following Elin
Diamond, I would characterize Mitchell’s radical naturalism as a form of realism’s
hysteria. She materializes her text’s controlling discourses, renders language physical – at
turns gorgeous and brutal. She pulls words across her performers’ bodies, marks those
bodies with language’s most violent traces, producing the body of discourse (the body
discourse anticipates, demands) as a symptom rather than a sign of cure. Pressing
psychological realism to its limit, Mitchell’s actors rush manically about the stage, twitter
and trip, worry their props, gasp and sob to the point of retching, as the conforming body
expected by naturalist mimesis collides with the affective and physical disavowals that
guarantee that body’s adherence to a rigorously unitary performance ethos. Hers are
are programmed, their popularity in drama schools, and of event stages dedicated to the
work of the period such as the popular Shaw Festival at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario.
Meanwhile, some of the most innovative non-realist performance of the last few years
has picked up on our studious fascination with fin-de-siècle forms. See Kim Solga,
‘Blasted’s Hysteria: Rape, Realism, and the Thresholds of the Visible’, Modern Drama,
50:3 (2007), 346-74.
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performances that literally haunt: ghosts emerge even as the actors attempt to play their
characters ‘straight’.

3. Precarious speech
When Hattie Morahan’s Iphigenia finally steps up to the microphone under the
bright, expectant lights that are the chorus women’s plague, ready to put on her show of
sacrifice, her voice seems to pull free from her tiny, vulnerable frame. It bounces around
the Lyttleton auditorium once, twice, three times, shuddering me with its reverberant
echo. Even as Iphigenia prepares at last to speak her father’s language, it is that very
language (of murder’s performative erasure, of brutal violence acted, naturally, as willing
sacrifice) that suddenly resonates, haunts, acquires a queer materiality. Her voice,
amplified by the microphone, is too loud; it is not especially natural. It sounds mediated,
technologized, imposed; meanwhile, Iphigenia herself oscillates between panicked
uncertainty and sure-footed delivery, and we hear the sound of both in her strangely
doubled, tripled, vocal echoes. Katie Mitchell, as I have argued, resists mainstream
British realism’s preference for properly measured speech over the awkward, excessive
sounds of aching, unruly bodies in crisis; Iphigenia at Aulis responds by amplifying and
distorting that measured speech at the moment when its reality effects count the most, the
moment when theatre is engaged to make over murder. Speaking of the work of Griselda
Gambaro, Diana Taylor asks: ‘how to stage “blinding” onstage?’25 Mitchell responds: by
translating the act of blinding into another sensory register, one in which blinding
becomes perceptible, tangible, as a violent act of representation. Iphigenia’s microphone
25
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– quite despite her own best efforts – mutates the language of violence as gift, as glory, as
national sacrifice, into precarious speech; in the powerful yet hollow reverb of her voice
we hear the echo of her body in the process of its going missing.
Iphigenia’s sacrificial performance before the microphone begins with the same
kind of awkward, jumbled jumpiness that characterizes much of the rest of the physical
movement in this production. Morahan fumbles to turn on the mike while every other
actor on stage seems wired to explode. She struggles, visibly and audibly, to invent her
‘heroic’ speech on the fly; she alternately grips and lets go of the microphone’s stand,
pressing her hands to her face and stammering ‘uh’s into the air. Iphigenia’s fumbling
gestures embody the ‘willing’ sacrifice as a performative figment, demonstrating the
extreme pressure violence’s rhetorical disappearance exerts on the body that must disown
the suffering it feels. In Iphigenia’s panic, her strain to make the speech of a lifetime
despite her body’s resistance to the script of sacrifice, I see and hear the devastating loss
– of life, of future, of family – her words work to erase. ‘I dedicate my body as a gift for
Greece’: each word is carefully intoned, Morahan leaning into the mouthpiece for good
measure. ‘Take me, sacrifice me, and then to Troy. Plunder the whole city, and when you
leave it leave a ruin. That will be my memorial’. She steps back, momentarily unable to
continue; she takes her hands off the microphone stand, which she has been clutching for
support, and pushes the heels of her palms hard into her eyes. I watch her strain for both
language and the tongue to speak it; at several moments, she breaks down, gasping and
crying, even as she channels the voice of the state through her body. She instructs her
mother not to weep as she claims ‘I am the lucky one’, but these words stick and she is
overcome. She tries not to cry into the mouthpiece. As she declares her final willingness
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– ‘this blood of mine will cancel the gods’ decree, and the ships will put to sea’ – she
gulps the last word, weeps, falls away, then returns to the mike, always conscious to
ensure that her convulsing head is below its own. Greece must not hear these forbidden
sounds.
Mitchell’s technique in this scene is one of selective amplification: Iphigenia’s
grand speech resonates through the walls and to the waiting crowd, boosted by the
microphone’s power, while those in her immediate space (including the auditorium
audience) also hear and see her bodily grief on a more intimate scale, hear and see it
collide with the microphone’s grand echo. The contrast is revelatory. Iphigenia’s body
seems pulled from itself, pulled apart, by language given a dimension of physical force
from the microphone’s powerful amperage; her words become, literally, a violent and
violating speech act meant to negate in utero the violating impact of the other, far more
brutal event on the horizon. Hers is plainly not a heartfelt speech; it is what they want to
hear, what needs to be said, crafted under what may look for many audience members
like uncomfortably familiar, oddly ‘real’ extremes of duress. It is also a speech crafted
visibly for and through the powers that surround and circumscribe this young girl: her
microphone is their tool, their idol, the thing that is supposed to make the state’s voice
(the voices of Agamemnon, Menelaus, Odysseus, Achilles) seem remarkable, natural,
unbreachable. Thus must her body match now the dimensions of its mimetic frame, must
her small voice, amplified a thousand-fold, mirror and confirm the force of its own. But,
like the chorus women’s foxtrotting bodies of earlier scenes, neither Iphigenia’s voice nor
her body can conform seamlessly to the performance convention that ensnares her at this
moment; backstage, we see through her manic rushing and momentary breakdowns
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cracks in the image of authority she projects, hear through her heaving sobs, carefully
hidden from the microphone’s mouthpiece, the trauma masked by words of false comfort.
Mitchell’s selective amplification works to produce troubling contrasts between
Iphigenia’s two bodies – between the suffering body and the state body, the body of
discipline and discourse and the body in contraband mourning – but it also works to
generate uncanny collisions between the body Iphigenia struggles to hide and the bodies
of her spectators, seemingly ensconced at a safe distance from the overwhelming grief on
stage. These collisions are most powerfully focused in the unexpected, largely accidental
moments of crossover between the scene’s auditory zones, when Morahan’s stammering
or crying is briefly picked up by the microphone and the sounds of her pain and
uncertainty fall over the auditorium in waves, reverberating in each of our watching
bodies with the visceral force of amplified sound. For a moment, whether we wish it or
resist it, find it harmless or upsetting, we embody the ghost of Iphigenia’s own grieving,
the affect Morahan desperately attempts to sign away but which returns to the scene,
endlessly, as the unshakeable sensation of loss. Iphigenia asks the chorus women to sing
into the microphone; they offer ‘All Things Bright and Beautiful’. Their weeping mixes
openly with the melody as both are fed through the amplifier, producing a striking vocal
dissonance I feel in my gut as much as in my brain, in that way bass-inflected sound has
of shuddering the abdomen. ‘Theatrical convention allows for splitting of mind from
body, enabling the audience to respond either emotionally or intellectually to the action it
sees on stage without responding physically,’ writes Taylor.26 Once more resisting,
refusing, convention, Mitchell implicates me, my body, and its history in this story,
26
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insisting that a just response to Iphigenia’s experience must be more than cognitive, and
far from simply binary.

4. Acts of witness
The sometimes broken, sometimes doubled voice Mitchell echoes through
Iphigenia’s microphone is not (or not just) the voice of earlier feminists who have raised
the radical potential of aurality against the tight strictures governing visual
representations of the female body. Rather, it is the voice Judith Butler attributes to what
Emmanuel Levinas calls the ‘face’: word and image confounded, scrambled by one
another, leaving spectators bereft of the usual tools of performative encounter. In her
Precarious Life (2004), Butler reads the face not as human, visual icon of profound
familiarity, but rather as a kind of proto-speech, ‘a scene of agonized vocalization’27 that
disrupts any claims to the familiar, the sense of the same, we might seek in another’s
face. Levinas’ face represents the sacrificial script reversed: not flesh made into (W)ord,
body forced to conform to the shape of a comforting language, but rather word made
flesh, text interrupted and mutated by the sudden tangibility, undeniability, of embodied
suffering. The face signs the Christian prohibition against murder – ‘thou shalt not kill’ –
and yet it may not be assimilated seamlessly into God’s Word (into the words of any
god) for it speaks in excess of Symbolic language, speaks ‘an agony, an injurability, at
the same time that it bespeaks a divine prohibition against killing’.28 The face, in other
words, manifests the power of violence alongside the force of its too-easily-elided
27
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consequences (agony, injurability), articulating ‘the wordless vocalization of suffering
that marks the limits of linguistic translation’ in the formula governing violence’s
performative erasure. ‘The face, if we are to put words to its meaning, will be that for
which no words really work’, Butler writes; ‘[it] seems to be a kind of sound, the sound
of language evacuating its sense, the sonorous substratum of vocalization that precedes
and limits the delivery of any semantic sense’.29 The face, finally, is the sound of human
suffering in the act of begging a witness, staged in front of (in the face of?) the equally
ardent and powerful call to translate that suffering into some other kind of sign. It is the
voice not before language but beneath it, expelled by it, the agonized sounds language
disavows in order to constitute itself as text, as the mark of civilization. The face is thus
also, and most importantly, a call to ethics,30 a call for me to witness the limit of my
power to represent the experience of an other; it provokes instead a different kind of
encounter, one that challenges the very way in which I come to know that other, and
know it from myself.
At the microphone, Iphigenia becomes this face. When the mike picks up her and
the other women’s unadorned sounds of agony alongside the sacrificial script of glory
and salvation (‘My sacrifice brings salvation to the Greeks, and victory’, Iphigenia tells
the crowd; she rushes away from the mike, frantic, as the chorus women continue to cry
and sing), we see, hear and feel the sounds that script expels, ‘the sound of language
evacuating its sense’; it moves us toward a visceral encounter with Iphigenia’s experience
that the normative regulations governing her violence’s performative erasure cannot
29

Ibid., p. 134.

30

Ibid.

26
contain, anticipate, or express. Mitchell’s radical naturalism offers in these uncanny
sound-images – in their power to enter our bodies, change momentarily our somatic
response to the performance – much more than realism’s hysterical body-double, come to
spook the boards of mainstream British theatre. In Iphigenia’s climactic scene I read no
less than Mitchell’s ethics of spectatorship, her challenge to the ways in which we have
been schooled to encounter, politely, the embodied stories of our stage.
At a roundtable discussion on empathy, activism, and performance at the 2007
ATHE conference in New Orleans,31 Sonja Arsham Kuftinec argued that we continue to
understand ‘empathy’ from within a largely enlightenment imaginary characterized by
clear distinctions between inside and outside; within this framework the objects of our
empathy will always exist somehow beyond the bounds of citizenship, in a space of
undifferentiated otherness clearly detached from ourselves. This form of empathy is
conventionally cathartic; it is a substitute for ethical engagement, one that reaffirms the
centrality of he or she who experiences suffering from a distance while further
marginalizing empathy’s recipients, the bodies in true crisis. In place of this bankrupt,
self-serving version, Kuftinec called for an empathy that might allow audiences to feel
‘with’ rather than ‘for’ the other, producing an engagement that is simultaneously
31

‘Regenerating Praxis: Roundtable on Empathy, Activism, and Performance in Times of

Crisis’ at the ATHE 2007 Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA, 26-29 July 2007. This
panel featured Rhonda Blair, Gay Gibson Cima, John Fletcher, Anne-Liese Juge-Fox,
Linda Kintz, and Sonja Arsham Kuftinec, and took place on Friday, 27 July in the
Rhythms ballroom at the Sheraton New Orleans. All quotations from Kuftinec and Kintz
in this paragraph are taken from my personal notes from the event.

27
affective and intellectual. Linda Kintz responded to Kuftinec’s call with a return to
Brecht and to the gap or ‘pause’ that motors all his theatre theory: the moment when
character, performer and spectator are each held in suspension, as individuals, before
actor ‘becomes’ character and spectator is pulled into the stage world. In that pause,
Kintz argued, ‘I’ am not yet ‘you’, but I am also not quite myself, the self I am most
comfortable imagining as myself. We all stand apart from our roles, and I as spectator, if
only for a moment, stand outside or beside myself, uncertain of my ground. Brecht, of
course, never sought to banish emotion from the stage; his Verfremdungseffekt is above
all a process of defamiliarizing the kinds of emotional attachments to which fin-de-siècle
stage realism had become accustomed. Kintz glosses Brecht for twenty-first century
performance by suggesting that the power to de-realize emotion in performance need not
yield only the clichéd, contemplative smoking spectator; it may also generate the
opposite, a profound spectatorial ‘undoing’.
I noted above that Mitchell is no Brechtian, but her performance ethic takes up
what Kintz characterizes as Brecht’s call to unsettle the watching body, to politicize not
just realism’s commitment to a certain kind of (contained) affect but also our spectatorial
attachment to particular brands of stage emotion, as well as our belief in what stage
emotion is meant to accomplish (and for whom). Mitchell’s actors work not to make us
feel for them, but to make us feel alongside them, to feel what they are doing: as they
flutter, babble, never stop moving, I feel my heart rate increase, my stomach turn from
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the motion sickness.32 Their actions trouble my watching with uncertain, manic feelings
that I cannot quite locate, but also cannot eradicate: as Iphigenia races between her
mother, the other women, the mannequin and her microphone, between her self in pain
and her self in performance, her voice oscillating between blubbering cries and a
disquieting, disembodied echo, I can also find no place to rest my watching, no place for
a stable encounter with her experience. I twist and fidget in my seat, cycle through my
own low-level psychosomatic reactions to the terror she projects. This is not – or not just
– what we might colloquially call ‘sympathy pains’, or more complexly
‘neuroempathy’;33 Morahan’s performance compels me to project something of her
trauma onto my body, but it also prevents me from feeling like myself, from feeling in
the usual way at a play. It throws the very apparatus of contained, distanced audience
feeling into disarray.34 This is ‘naturalism’ not as acting convention but as audience
32
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provocation, a somatic response that generates in turn an ethical choice: as Iphigenia’s
performance at the microphone grows less and less convincing, it pushes me to move
beyond traditional viewing modes and toward what Kelly Oliver calls witnessing ‘beyond
recognition’.35
To witness beyond recognition is to understand the experience of the other as both
profoundly connected to our own, and yet quite beyond the boundaries of our immediate
production not as definitive, but as one possible response alongside what I believe to be
its profound potential. Moreover, I am aware that the nature of the auditorium in which
this production was staged no doubt had an important effect on how Mitchell’s actors’
work might have been received by a gamut of spectators. While one could easily argue
that the grand and formal qualities of the National Theatre’s Lyttleton auditorium would
detract from the intimate suffering on stage, encouraging distanced watching despite the
manic fluster of the characters, I suspect the opposite. The voice emanating from
Iphigenia’s microphone, for example, resonated with particular power around such a
huge space, and the sonorous clangs of the various machinery employed during the
production – to, for example, slam doors shut or bring the safety curtain down – were
made literally palpable as a result of their own vast echoes against the high walls. If
anything, I found the collision of the large, formal, proscenium space and Iphigenia’s
troubled embodiment to add to, rather than to limit, the disorienting effects Mitchell
sought to produce. My thanks to Caridad Svich for prompting me to think more about the
Lyttleton space itself in relation to my argument.
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understanding. The witness beyond recognition is not an eyewitness; rather, he or she
distrusts the evidence of sight and looks for other ways, other sensory, affective, and
intellectual avenues, to bear witness to what is not immediately visible or recognizable, to
what lies, as Diana Taylor might say, beyond the act of blinding, the disappearing act.
When we spectate, Roger Simon argues, we engage actively with what we see and hear,
but we also work, just as actively, to manage our experience of the other’s story at a safe
distance from ourselves (what Kuftinec might call an enlightenment practice of empathy).
Simon points out that there is nothing wrong with this form of spectatorship; it is an
essential human practice that makes most intersubjective encounter possible. But he also
notes that spectatorship alone can never produce a genuinely ethical encounter, an
encounter with the other as other that is the province of the witness, because it refuses to
place the spectator him or herself in a position of emotional or epistemological
vulnerability, of ‘undoing’. For Simon, as for Linda Kintz, witness is both an act of
embodiment and an act of dis-embodiment: as a witness I become implicated in the story
of the other, become ‘obligated’ by his or her testimony,36 while also allowing myself to
become profoundly disturbed, disarticulated, by the foreign contours of that story.
Witnessing makes us question who we are, what we think we know, and how we know it;
it ‘is neither a metaphor for simply being emotionally moved by another’s story nor a
traumatic repetition’, but ‘signals a recognition of an encounter with difficult knowledge
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[…] that which brings me more than I can contain’.37 The witness to trauma, as Dori
Laub puts it, must also be prepared to be ‘a witness to himself [sic]’.38
How does Katie Mitchell, finally, show us to ourselves, demand a
reconfiguration of our knowledge of this girl Iphigenia, her violence, its loss? Her
speeches over (her time run out), Iphigenia is hauled bodily offstage. ‘Not one tear,
mother!’ Morahan shouts, frantic, as she is pulled away; left behind, Clytemnestra
crumbles, shrieking and sobbing, to the floor as the door clangs shut. That clang is louder
than life; like so much else here it has an uncanny voice, and as that voice booms through
the auditorium it makes once more manifest the haunting, echoing sounds of loss that
have littered the preceding scene. Then, the door comes down; loud, loud machine noises
fill the entire space. The ceiling rains in; the chorus women run away. Iphigenia is
murdered – and the house goes, literally, to pieces.
An old man enters to tell Clytemnestra of Iphigenia’s miracle transformation on
the altar, but by now the damage is done. The soothing promise of salvation for mother,
daughter, and for Greece he brings (and which Achilles echoes, as he tells Clytemnestra
to ‘put away’ her grief and anger against her husband) cannot erase the physical force
with which Mitchell has performed Iphigenia’s final erasure, translated it not into signs,
into text, but into a kind of architectural destruction, an almost earthquake-like
Armageddon. We do not see either the violence of sacrifice or sacrifice’s supposed
conversion into the body/text of myth; instead, we hear in our assaulted ears and feel in
our jolted frames the resonance of suffering and terror that cannot simply be talked away,
37
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easily turned to comfort, even as the old messenger attempts once more, futilely, to do
just that. For Roger Simon, the ‘touch of the past’ that moves the witness is worldshaking in this very way; it is a remembrance that is ‘always incomplete’,39 a story for
which we don’t quite have a proof, impelling us ‘into a confrontation and reckoning not
only with stories of the past but also with ourselves as we are (historically, existentially,
socially) in the present’.40 To act as Iphigenia’s witness is to ask the question: how does
what I have just seen, or what I have just failed to see, change the way I will look from
now on? Will I remember Iphigenia as the echo of an old man’s fond language? As the
echo of her own choking narrative of sacrifice? Or will I remember her by the force of
her ravaged sounds echoing through my body, by the shock of the blasts that shook my
seat, brought a building down? In whose reality effects – in whose ‘reality’ – will I invest
my faith, and why?
This is what performance, at its best, can do for the women who are the victims of
its disappearing acts. It can stage the call to witness that ghosts all spectatorship, and
demand of an audience these crucial choices: how will I choose to see and hear? What
risks, what encounters with body, with affect, will I permit myself, and from what will I
turn away? How will I let this scene change me, change what I expect from the theatre?
This kind of performance – call it a feminist performance of violence – does not ask how
it might make the experience of violence’s loss seem real on stage. Rather, it asks
Taylor’s question: how stage a blinding? When a woman’s body in violence, suffering,
panic and fear promises to go so spectacularly missing – as does Iphigenia’s here – this
39
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rebel transformation returns not just that body but the chilling echo of its absence to the
scene of representation, and asks us to engage with the sounds, the sensations, of loss.

